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Segmented Intermediation. Advice Concepts  
in German Financial Services  
Karoline Krenn ∗ 
Abstract: »Segmentierte Vermittlung. Beratungskonzepte im deutschen Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsbereich«. This article focuses on classification as an orde-
ring component in the intermediation between production and consumption in 
markets. Classifications and corresponding categories build the cognitive infra-
structure for engagements in production, distribution, and employment and 
consumption. In this article I emphasize the discriminating aspects of segmen-
tation resulting from social grouping along categories. Segmentation structures 
the allocation of resources by means of access restrictions and distribution 
mechanisms among other things. Empirically, I explore the access to the client-
orientated advice of private clients in the context of financial services. Inter-
view data suggests that advisers of “high net worth” clients are able to main-
tain their client-orientation against organizational constraints. As remarkable 
as this finding is, it also shows that segmentation leads to adverse consequences 
regarding access to client-oriented advice. Opening up financial advice to lower 
income groups is far away from implementing consumer pre-eminence. The 
theoretical contribution of this article is to confirm the potential of market 
classifications for the study of market intermediation, which will be elaborated 
in a prospective research agenda. 
Keywords: Market intermediation, market segmentation, financial advice, social 
inequality. 
1.  Introduction 
This article1 contributes to the subject of market classification by framing it as 
a problem of market intermediation. My interest lies in finding out how finan-
cial advisers conceptualize intermediation between financial products and 
clients. Thereby I am particularly concerned to what extent the segmentation of 
                                                             
∗  Karoline Krenn, Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002 
Lucerne, Switzerland; karoline.krenn@doz.unilu.ch. 
1  I am grateful for the very insightful comments and suggestions made by Rainer Diaz-Bone, 
Silke Wollscheid, and Jacob Habinek on an earlier version of this article. Of course, the con-
tent is exclusively the author’s responsibility. In addition, I also want to thank Nina Baur for 
engaging my interest during a discussion of the problem of intermediation between pro-
duction and consumption.  
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bank clients influences the service relation between advisers and their clients. 
While Fourcade and Healy (2017 [2013]) look at the effects of digitized classi-
fications for the consumer credit market, my own focus is on “old style” classic 
categories (economic value) and the access to good investment advice. Finan-
cial advice services trade in the relational promise of good advice about finan-
cial investment. My findings will discuss varying treatment of customers ac-
cording to their market segment. In doing so, the article looks at how 
classifications affect market actors (see also Chiapello and Godefroy 2017, in 
this HSR Special Issue). I relate testimonials from advisers on this intermedia-
tion to different segments and discuss to what extent segmentation practices in 
the financial service industry contribute to the reproduction of pre-existing 
social hierarchies through an unequal access to financial knowledge and a 
systematic exclusion from opportunities. In other words, this article looks into 
the effects of classification, i.e. segmentation, for the intermediation between 
production and consumption in the moment of trade. Thereby, I hope to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the challenges in the financial advice field. 
Finally, my aim with this article is to push forward the empirical study of mar-
ket intermediation as such.  
Private clients in the financial service industry are (as is quite common for 
market consumers) subjected to organizational classifications (Lazarus 2012). 
Segmentation criteria are the profitability and “net worth” of the customer base 
(Storbacka 1997). More or less in all three German bank types (commercial 
banks, savings banks, and credit unions), clients are divided into a retail seg-
ment and a private wealth segment. This segmentation is a key element of a 
neo-liberal re-structuring process of finance that started in Germany in the late 
1980s (Haipeter and Wagner 2007). By following this novel cognitive infra-
structure, banks carried out a shift from a client- to a market- and sales-
orientation.  
The role of market segmentation is easy to understand when we look at it as 
a driver of market dynamics. As an ordering force it affects market-making. 
Segmentation operates with classification systems and with the categories they 
provide, which are considered to have an order-producing role (Douglas 1966). 
They build the cognitive infrastructure for production, distribution, employ-
ment and consumption along the supply and production chain (Desrosières and 
Thévenot 1979; White 1981; DiMaggio 1987; Bourdieu 2005; Zhao 2005; 
Desrosières and Thévenot 2005 [1988]; Zhao 2008; Fourcade and Healy 2017 
[2013]). Moreover, market segmentation is strongly connected to market ex-
pansion, as it is often related to new products or services. Marketing introduced 
it as an alternative to mass-customization and a tool for individualized targeting 
of consumers (Smith 1956). In the case of financial advice services in Germa-
ny, bank manuals for investment advice portray the creation of a retail segment 
as opening up the access to financial planning for the lower income classes 
(Dexheimer, Schubert and Ungnade 1988). Nevertheless, the marketing litera-
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ture tells us that client segmentation in banks is a strategy based on profit ex-
pectations (Storbacka 1997; Machauer and Morgner 2001). 
Drawing on the value-orientated sociology of markets (Aspers 2011; Aspers 
and Beckert 2011; Beckert and Musselin 2013) and conventionalist literature 
(Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995; Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 1997; Bessy 
and Chauvin 2013; Diaz-Bone 2015), I use market classifications as the lens to 
highlight the social practice of intermediation between the spheres of produc-
tion and consumption in the field of financial investment advice for private 
clients.  
In this article, I will proceed as follows. First, I will look at theoretical ap-
proaches to market valuation and discuss the role of market intermediation. 
Second, I will outline my research perspective on financial intermediation. 
Then, I will contextualize client segmentation as an element of wider institu-
tional changes in the German financial service sector. This is followed by a 
short section on method and data collection followed by my empirical findings 
from interviews about how financial advisors conceive their advisory role. In 
the discussion I evaluate my findings and draw conclusions about the social 
underpinnings of the knowledge production relation between advisers and their 
clients in financial services. The article ends with suggestions for opening up a 
new research agenda on the intermediation of production and consumption 
through market classifications. 
2.   Towards a Sociology of Market Intermediation 
Recent approaches in market sociology explain the order in a market by look-
ing at what is valued (Aspers 2010; Karpik 2010; Beckert and Aspers 2011). 
Valuations clarify what (or who) markets are about. Thereby, quality construc-
tion is based on classification systems and the attribution of qualities to catego-
ries or classes (Beckert and Musselin 2013), which makes market classification 
a central topic in these theories. Classification is a concept used in different 
literatures with varying meanings (see also Krüger and Reinhart 2017, in this 
HSR Special Issue). In its sociological origins, the concept of classification 
refers to a cognitive system of social representation (Durkheim 1915; Durk-
heim and Mauss 1963) providing categories to sort and group entities (Douglas 
1966, 1986). Two features that I am going to take up again in the next section 
are especially relevant: first, classifications are instruments of distinction 
(Bourdieu 1984) and boundary-marking (Tilly 2005), and, second, categories 
have a tendency to naturalize themselves (Thévenot 1984; Bowker and Star 
2000). Just for conceptual clarification, segments are, just like classes, an out-
come of classification practices (see Chiapello and Godefroy, as well as Prid-
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more and Hämäläinen 2017, in this HSR Special Issue).2 Thus, segmentation 
describes a grouping of actors or goods in markets at the end of a chain of 
market classifications, which comes into existence when the cognitive infra-
structure (Desrosières and Thévenot 1979; White 1981; DiMaggio 1987; Bour-
dieu 2005; Zhao 2005) of a market order (Hayek 1973; Aspers 2010) turns into 
an organized infrastructure. This happens in the labor market (Beckert and 
Zafirovski 2011) in relation to the quality of goods (Eymard-Duvernay 1989) 
and in marketing (Kotler 1989; Blecker and Friedrich 2006; Piller 2006). And it 
is exactly what Fourcade and Healy (2017 [2013]) call “within-market classifica-
tion”.  
A market order solves the central problem of coordination in markets 
(Beckert 2009). The shaping of this order requires an active engagement with 
many actors involved: producers, marketing agents, retailers, consumers, and 
different types of intermediaries. How are goods and products brought togeth-
er? How is a certain group of products connected to a particular group of con-
sumers? The standard link between production and consumption is the market 
itself. Former approaches in the sociology of markets stress the structure and 
social organization of markets, the role of networks and institutions (Swedberg 
2005) against the economist assumption that prices alone steer markets. Trade 
and exchange are theorized through the distinction between buyer and seller 
roles, the individualistic presumption of actor motives, embedded trust rela-
tions or as regulated by institutional arrangements such as property rights (As-
pers 2010). The main strands in economic sociology deal with interconnected 
markets in industries, the coordination along the production chain and differen-
tiation of producer markets (White 1981). However, this picture appears in-
complete unless market intermediation is included as a dynamic engagement 
bridging the spheres of production and consumption particularly if we regard 
the construction of quality in markets (Beckert and Musselin 2013). What ap-
proaches do we find towards such a sociology of market intermediation? 
Perceiving (quality) uncertainty as information problem, one could first 
think of intermediation as the brokerage of information. However, structural 
approaches discuss brokerage as a strategic tool (Burt 1992, 2005), but seldom 
as a practice that bridges the production and the consumption sphere. Here, 
there has been groundbreaking literature from the conventionalist approach 
(see also Diaz-Bone 2017, in this HSR Special Issue), which sets a special 
focus on intermediaries and their qualitative brokerage role in the process of 
economic coordination (Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995; Bessy and Chauvin 
                                                             
2  The sociological literature on classification is rather negligent of segmentation as a classifi-
cation practice of its own. Prospectively, my view on segmentation as a classification out-
come could be easily integrated into the systemization by Krüger and Reinhart 2017 (in this 
issue) either as element of a valuation infrastructure or as additional sixth building block of 
valuation.  
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2013; Diaz-Bone 2015). This literature argues that intermediaries shape mar-
kets by engaging in valuation (Bessy and Chauvin 2013). Beside the labor 
market and the question of recruitment (Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 1997) 
this literature examines in particular the field of finance and financial market 
coordination (Orléan 2014).3 The social engagement in valuation is used as a 
conceptual link for the social organization of the market exchange. On this 
view, the downstream end of market flows, the interface between producers 
and consumers, is more than a simple “yes” (= buy) or “no” (= don’t buy) 
decision. One way of explaining consumer decisions is regarding choices as a 
kind of judgment, mediated by judgment devices (Karpik 2010). In the context 
of the mediation of quality-uncertain goods the relation between consumer 
needs (or wants) and qualities of products is discussed as the individualization 
(Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa 2002) or singularization of goods (Karpik 
2010). From this direction, we see the first steps towards a sociology of trade 
(Cochoy and Dubuisson-Quellier 2000; Cochoy and Grandclément 2005; Kar-
pik 2010). Most other approaches to consumption have a much more constrict-
ed perspective.4 Sociology of consumption focuses on status, habits, styles, and 
social milieus (Veblen 1899; Bourdieu 1984). Consumer culture studies ana-
lyze how households are categorized by their consumption behavior (Lunt and 
Livingstone 1992). In marketing research, the probing, partitioning and priori-
tizing of consumer segments are individual strategies for positioning goods and 
services (Kotler 1989; Piller 2006).  
Apart from my impression that a systematic investigation on bridging pro-
duction to consumption is just about to start, a weakness of the existing theory 
of intermediation is negligence of its relational pattern. Role and norm conflicts 
arising from the in-between situation of intermediaries have not yet been suffi-
ciently incorporated into the literature. In consumer markets but also in other 
interfaces of production and consumption, a core problem of intermediation 
lies in coordinating a frame of evaluation (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) to 
determine what the quality of a product consists in. Intermediation is a bi-
directed relation embedded in a market infrastructure (culture, law, and organi-
zations). Engagements in the attachment and translation of qualities, in the 
                                                             
3  The sociology of finance takes a general interest in the intermediation of information (Knorr 
Cetina and Preda 2005). There we find studies on trade in the bond market which focus on 
opportunistic behavior of traders (Abolafia 1996), on the trading floor as social space 
(Beunza and Stark 2005; Hassoun 2005) and on intermediaries as evaluators (Rona-Tas and 
Hiss 2011) among other things. The prominent role of valuation in financial markets is ex-
plained by the circumstance that those markets are very sensitive to meeting legitimate 
categories in role performance (Zuckerman 1999). Zuckerman shows how the audience as 
third party acts as critic and mediates financial markets. A recent contribution is Orléan’s 
work on the social forces producing value in finance (Orléan 2014). 
4  As another exception, debates on the prosumer (Ritzer 2015) as a portmanteau of producer 
and consumer need to be mentioned here. This study also points to the necessity of a sys-
tematic inquiry on the social foundations and structures of trading as social interaction. 
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matching of supply and demand are directed upstream to the production as well 
as downstream to the consumption side. Bringing a relational perspective on 
this triadic structure spots “ties that torture” behind intermediation (Krackhardt 
1999). My contribution aims at identifying the conflicting social obligations 
connected with intermediation. A thorough and systematic inquiry is pending 
to look at interactions and spaces in which this conflict is processed. I don’t 
want to give the impression that I could achieve this task within this article. 
Nevertheless, I want to contribute to this endeavor by discussing the example 
of financial advice. 
This article brings a fresh theoretical focus to the debate by taking into con-
sideration the following: considering the ordering power of market classifica-
tions it is plausible to assume that classifications are the key to understanding 
conflicts in intermediation as well. Accordingly, the theoretical interest of this 
article lies in exploring how the differentiation in actor segments affects market 
intermediation. In other words, it is about distinctions made between single 
market segments in the eye of the intermediary.  
3.  Financial Services as (Segmented) Market Intermediation 
The service industry is an interesting field to study market intermediation. Not 
only is service regarded as a hybrid activity blurring the boundaries of produc-
tion and consumption (Du Gay and Salaman 1992), service organizations up-
hold a tension between conventions of coordination because of the impact of 
human relations (Thévenot 2001).5 The case of German financial services is all 
the more unique due to the shift from client- to market-orientation this industry 
went through in the late 20th century (next section). In the course of neo-
liberalization, the market expansion of financial products increased the need for 
intermediation. Generally, with post-industrialism and with a growing infor-
mation economy, knowledge-based services become a more important domain 
of markets (Bell 1973; Castells 2010). In this particular case, product diversifi-
cation and the growing complexity of financial instruments pose challenges for 
the financial literacy of clients (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). At the same time, 
the participation in the financial market has turned into a key imperative of 
contemporary lifespan planning of the middle classes (Langley 2008). Various 
push and pull factors, such as the withdrawal of the welfare state and the ex-
pansion of personal pension plans, on the one hand, and the diversity of prod-
ucts on the other hand, make financial intermediation a non-trivial social inter-
action. Financial products don’t sell like hot cakes. Recent studies point to the 
                                                             
5  Thévenot (2001, 416) argues that a detachment from the domestic orientation, which is 
based on relations and trust, is difficult to effect in the service industry. 
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great significance of market intermediaries for the translation between product 
and clients’ needs (Vargha 2011) and the different roles intermediaries might 
take here (Lazarus 2012).  
Financial advice services mediate market transactions between bank organi-
zations and bank clients.6 In the typology of Bessy and Chauvin (2013), inter-
mediaries may act as distributors, matchmakers, consultants or evaluators. 
From an organizational perspective advisers are distributers. With respect to 
mass-distribution as in the retail segment, intermediation means choosing a 
valuation frame (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Financial advisers are also 
matchmakers insofar as they aim at bringing supply and demand together. 
These matches follow categorizations and advisers play a decisive part in the 
use of categories, such as by expanding or restricting them. As consultants, 
advisers act as “brokers of language” when they connect symbolic meaning and 
material goods or groups of individuals (Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995). 
Accordingly, intermediaries contribute in various ways to the cognitive seg-
mentation of markets (Bessy and Chauvin 2013).  
It is important to notice the conflict of roles and norms underlying interme-
diation to understand the challenges of financial advisers. Looking at the inter-
action structure of this intermediation, there are two positions, an adviser who 
is consulted as expert and a client who seeks to solve an investment problem. 
By theoretical abstraction, the advice role describes an interaction aimed at 
lowering the information asymmetry for the client regarding financial 
knowledge. Actually, this fits the picture of informational brokerage. With 
regard to the quality uncertainty of financial products advice giving involves 
the ascription of qualities, which is based on varying legitimated criteria. On 
the one hand, advice has a strong cultural connotation of disinterestedness 
(Schützeichel 2004). Good advice is legitimated by the orientation towards the 
client. On the other hand, the bank organization has a strong self-interest con-
cerning the implications of advice for market actions. From this viewpoint, 
advisers are sales distributers. Legitimated by employment contracts, good 
advice follows sales objectives.  
Having outlined these constraints on intermediation, I now want to specify 
my research questions. I am asking how financial advisers translate these con-
tradictory demands in their conceptualization of advice. And relating this to 
market segmentation, I am interested in whether there are differences in this 
                                                             
6  The need for mediation applies only for markets where consumers have difficulties in evalu-
ating goods (Zuckerman 1999). Consumer decision-making in market exchanges with low 
complexity levels such as the purchase of bread rolls is likely to be routinized. Compared to 
this example, the purchase of financial investment products is more complex, less likely to 
be routinized and in many cases involves personal intermediation. This also makes it attrac-
tive for empirical investigation. 
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translation between different market segments. By following these questions I 
want to explore how segmentation affects market intermediation.  
The driving assumption of my approach is that intermediaries not only con-
tribute to segmentation, but that the sorting of clients into different market 
segments affects the manner of intermediation. As findings for French banking 
services show, valuation of clients and client segments affects the treatment 
they receive when it comes to consumer credits (Lazarus 2012). If this also 
holds for financial investment advice, this would also imply that market seg-
mentation distributes access to financial knowledge and quality assessments 
unequally, and thereby also very likely affects life-chances. For a better under-
standing of the classification practices and consequences involved I will ad-
dress boundary criteria and naturalizations of boundaries.  
What are boundary criteria in financial services? Drawing on marketing lit-
erature, we find several different ways to segment customers: “(1) segmenta-
tion based on combining relationship revenue and relationship cost, (2) seg-
mentation based on relationship volume, (3) segmentation based on customer 
relationship profitability, (4) segmentation based on combining relationship 
volume and customer relationship profitability” (Storbacka 1997, 484). In other 
words, boundary criteria are variations on profitability, which speaks against 
the marketing literature that conceives market segmentation as implication of 
increased consumer pre-eminence (Kotler 1989; Blecker and Friedrich 2006; 
Piller 2006). We find such segments in a spatial separation of “low net worth” 
and “high net worth” customers into special branch offices or sections. For a 
discussion on the limitations of customer segmentation practices see Pridmore 
and Hämäläinen (2017, in this HSR Special Issue). 
The impact of segmentation depends on differences in the content of inter-
mediation, which facilitate different market exchanges. Such distinctions have 
benefits as well as negative effects. Starting with the former, segmentation 
reduces complexity, provides orientation and focuses attention (Lounsbury and 
Rao 2004; Schneiberg and Berk 2010). When targeting clients intermediaries 
introduce a pre-selected range of products, whereby offers are tailored to group 
data such as milieu-specific interests or resources available, which saves time 
and information processing capacity (transaction costs). This is the idea behind 
customized solutions. They simplify market coordination. Its ordering capacity 
structures roles, makes activities predictable and stabilizes market relations 
(Hayek 1973; Aspers 2010). On the other hand, there are also negative effects. 
As already outlined in the introduction to this HSR Special Issue (Krenn 2017), 
a look at the history of social measurement reveals its contingencies. It is tools 
of measurement themselves that construct differences. Grouping does not just 
follow natural variances, it is an interventional logic (Hacking 1983). Groups 
are naturalized (Thévenot 1984; Bowker and Star 2000), which becomes rele-
vant when evaluating the social impact of grouping. Arguing on basis of the 
nature of subjects/objects serves as moral licensing or justification. The sym-
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bolic attribution of worthy behavior that resulted in the accumulation of capital 
validates the idea of a natural grouping (by wealth), which is particularly criti-
cal because it legitimizes the systematic exclusion from opportunities, and 
thereby reinforces the naturalization of categorical boundaries by segmentation. 
Segmentation by wealth valorizes economic achievement. In a Durkheimian 
reading, it reveals a homology between market classifications and the social 
structure.7 There is even a stronger nexus. In cases where segmented practices 
distribute investment chances unequally they contribute to the reproduction of 
pre-existing social hierarchies. This is exactly what happens in the case of 
credit ratings and moral devalorization described by Fourcade and Healy (2017 
[2013]). 
Client segmentation appears in an even more critical light when we turn to a 
strand of marketing literature that discloses the motivational strategy behind it 
(Storbacka 1997; Machauer and Morgner 2001). Segmentation is related to 
customer relationship profitability. The textbook logic looks like this:  
identify your target segment; describe the characteristics of the segment mem-
bers; determine their needs as to the product that you are selling, adapt the 
marketing mix components according to the segment’s needs, sell the prod-
ucts, get increased product profitability and thus increased profitability of the 
firm. (Storbacka 1997, 479)8  
However, this profit perspective stands in a sense in opposition to the common 
belief in the fiduciary relationship between banks and their clients, a particular 
element of the German tradition of client-oriented banking (Haipeter and Wag-
ner 2007). This contradiction invites us to ask where this culture of profit 
comes from. For this reason the next section discusses the institutional context 
of segmentation and related job demands for advisers. 
4.   Financial Intermediation: The German Context 
Starting around the 1990s, Germany’s finance industry faced an institutional 
shift from client- to market-orientation.9 Client segmentation is one of the key 
elements of related re-structuring processes in the financial service sector (Hai-
                                                             
7  In other market areas discussed in this HSR Special Issue (for example in the contribution by 
Akos Rona-Tas 2017) we find classifications connected to market behavior such as credit 
history. By these procedures, different classes of creditworthiness are morally justified 
(Fourcade and Healy 2017 [2013]). But as the authors show, even in these cases the classi-
fied market behavior is strongly connected to pre-existing social hierarchies. 
8  Storbacka (1997) also argues that this textbook logic oversimplifies the empirical phenomenon.  
9  The market-orientation of the bank organization corresponds with a sales-orientation of 
financial advisers. In the empirical part I will talk of sales-orientation instead of market-
orientation because this terminology is closer to the interviewees.  
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peter and Wagner 2007). To understand its impact, one has to set these shifts in 
the context of a broader institutional change. 
German banking is historically founded on family-managed private banks 
and a tradition of long-term trust relations (Pohl 1982; Reitmayer 1999). With 
rapid industrialization, universal banks became more important by the end of 
the 19th century (Tilly 1986; Fohlin 2006). But universal banks also followed a 
trust-based business strategy. Although most literature focuses strongly on cor-
porate finance, client-orientation is a major characteristic of German banking. 
After World War II, a tripartite structure of commercial credit banks, sav-
ings banks and credit unions was established. Regional market strategies and a 
low level of concentration kept competition low and flexibility high (Baethge, 
D'Alessio and Oberbeck 1999; Deeg 1999). From the 1980s on global financial 
competition encouraged market expansion. The financial service industry in 
liberal fore-runner nations had already identified the retail sector as a niche 
(Moran 1991).10 Globalization and increasing competition also modified the 
strategic orientation of commercial and saving banks in Germany from highly 
regulated and bureaucratic to cost- and sales-oriented enterprises. More specifi-
cally it enforced a move from locally embedded compartmentalization to com-
petition for segmental market share.11 The disembedding of trading activities, 
the shift from owners and creditors to intermediaries and brokers, and the en-
gagement in investment banking accelerated from 2002 on (Hardie and Howart 
2009).  
These market-driven transformations also upended the organization of finan-
cial services through a triple process of deregulation, increased rationalization 
and technological change. New leitmotifs involved saving costs by outsourcing 
services and by the use of new technologies as well as the segmentation of 
clients and products (Kitay et al. 2007). Most noticeable were the introduction 
of new delivery channels (e.g. ATMs), telephone banking and the employment 
of information technologies in data processing. Haipeter and Wagner (2007) 
however regard the segmentation of customers and products as the key element 
of restructuring processes in Germany. 
                                                             
10  This has also to be seen in connection with structural changes in the organization of finan-
cial markets and their intrusion in additional societal spheres, discussed as financialization 
(Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005; Krippner 2005; Windolf 2005; van der Zwan 2014). Liberal 
market economies such as the UK were leading this process (Du Gay 1993). Changes for 
Germany first of all affected corporate financing. The extent of change described in the lit-
erature varies from a profound liberalization (Regini et al. 1999) to a bifurcation between 
old bank-based and new market-based mechanisms (Deeg 2005, 2009). Deeg’s analysis shows 
that credit unions and savings bank maintained relational banking strategies with small and 
medium enterprises; major changes applied predominantly to large private banks (ibid.). 
11  On the general transition of the German system see Krahnen and Schmidt (2004) and 
Streeck (2009). In contrast to them, Hackethal (2004) argues against convergence.  
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With regard to labor relations, job functions were divided, branch-networks 
restructured (Baethge, D'Alessio and Oberbeck 1999), and hierarchically struc-
tured lifetime employment turned into fragmented careers with declining job 
security (Regini et al. 1999). New forms of management and control were a 
part of all this. Indirect governance mechanisms such as sales-based reward 
systems were introduced (Voß and Pongratz 1998), but by the end of the 1990s 
these were still the exception (Baethge, D'Alessio and Oberbeck 1999). Compen-
sation by skill level and seniority was deeply rooted. The 2000s radically 
changed this. Along with a steady process of deskilling and increasing con-
straints on advisers’ work autonomy, product offers were calculated by auto-
mated software systems (Shire 2005) which retrieved standardized products.  
The literature also shows how these market-driven changes affected client 
interaction. The German tradition of financial advice services included long-
term relationships with clients founded on interpersonal knowledge and trust. 
However, embedded relations were an obstacle to the novel sales culture which 
set sales targets for branches, and, subsequently, for employees. In order to 
redefine client interactions as “sales opportunities” (Baethge, Kitay and Regalia 
1999, 10) a bank-driven mode of contact was introduced. As a side-effect, 
clients alternated between advisers. Client selection tools were based on auto-
mated classifications along client profiles. Clients thereby lost sovereignty to 
initiate the interaction (Korczynski 2001).12 The main objective of this shift in 
control was the generation and management of demand for new financial prod-
ucts. The products in question range from ordinary securities to mutual funds, 
stock trading accounts and various retirement products (Greenwood and 
Scharfenstein 2013). 
Until the 1990s, the shift away from a transaction-based organizational 
model toward a sales-orientation had a strongly experimental character. But 
nevertheless even at that early stage of the restructuring process three main 
negative effects were identified: conflicting job demands (Moldaschl 2001), 
paradoxical recognition requirements (Holtgrewe 2002), and threats to the 
commitment and consent to the organization’s goals, especially through new 
remuneration practices (Baethge, Kitay and Regalia 1999).  
All these joint developments increase uncertainty for the intermediation of 
production and consumption of financial products. It stands to reason to assume 
that advisers following a sales-orientation resolve conflicting job demands toward 
the production side. But is there still client-orientation despite organizational 
constraints? And is there a connection to segmentation of clients? The aim of this 
article is to investigate existing advice concepts in financial services empirically. 
                                                             
12  Frequently, call-centers acted as new delivery channels (Korcynski 2001; Shire 2005), but 
call duties also devolved onto advisers. 
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5.   The Empirical Study 
In this empirical section I accomplish three things: After a short report on data 
and method, I analyze how financial advisers reflect on the intermediation of 
financial products and organize job requirements, and subsequently, in the 
summary of findings, I make a suggestion about the extent to which their con-
ceptualization of advice is connected to client segmentation.  
5.1   Data and Method 
In the following I will present qualitative interview data with nine financial 
advisers collected in 2010 in Berlin.13 I applied a narrative interview approach 
combined with problem-centered sections (Schütze 1977; Scheibelhofer 2008). 
The narrative interview has been shown in the literature to be especially suited 
for critical events or transformation processes (Holtgrewe 2009). The initiating 
question invited financial advisers to narrate their professional biography and 
their daily practice of intermediation. Interviews were recorded, transcribed 
and coded. For the analysis, I applied content analysis (Mayring 2000). It must 
be pointed out that interviewing has methodological limitations (Lamont and 
Swidler 2014). There is no guarantee of a complete correspondence between 
disclosed interview content and inner reflection, and the social desirability of 
response behavior has to be considered. Also, the sample is small and not rep-
resentative (Gerring 2011). Therefore, these findings can only have an explora-
tive character. Nevertheless, the data gathered raises important issues and con-
cerns about financial advice service, which are fruitful for the discussion on 
(segmented) intermediation. 
5.2   Empirical Findings: Advice Concepts in Action 
Client-related activities in financial planning involve several steps: first con-
tacting clients, then profiling their financial situation and making suggestions 
                                                             
13  The study is based on nine interviews with financial advisers who were or used to be em-
ployed in banks and had active client contact. In the selection of interview partners I aimed 
for a field access that was as open as possible. Berlin-based bank branches from major pri-
vate banks, credit unions and savings banks were personally approached to ask for their 
participation in the study. Only in one case (Volksbank) did this actually lead to an inter-
view. Another interview contact was generated by the trade union. And finally, I contacted 
individual financial advisers through the professional social network XING according to their 
job specification; this approach produced the remaining interviewees. Among the interview-
ees, four belonged to credit unions and savings banks, two of whom dealt with the segment 
of wealthy clients. Five worked (or had worked) in private banks, one of whom was a free-
lance adviser still working at the premises of a private bank. Another one was on the job 
market, and a third interviewee operated independently. All but one had received their 
training before the 2000s, five of them in the 1980s or before. All but one were male. 
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for financial products. And in the long run, financial planning involves the 
maintenance of client-relations. Talking about these client-related activities 
evoked a strong desire in interviewees to explain themselves. The way advisers 
justified their practice revealed different orientations towards their conception 
of “good advice.” It also incorporated their ideal of a client-adviser relation, 
and it exposed various difficult aspects of their actions. 
Interview data in this section illustrates that client-orientation among advisers 
prevails in segments of wealthy clients. As outlined above, the adviser must 
deal with conflicting job demands. On the one hand, there is a cultural claim of 
disinterestedness. On the other hand financial advisers face organizational 
objectives. When clients come to bank branches to receive recommendations for 
their deposit or investment strategy, sales- and client-orientations run up against 
each other. Situational factors delegate the resolution of this conflict to financial 
advisers. In the following I will discuss different concepts of advice articulated by 
advisers. Then I will put these concepts in the context of client segmentations. 
Client-Orientation 
It was a strong observation that client- and skill-orientation were still quite 
pronounced for some of the interviewees. In cases of such an orientation I 
found these aspects narratively rooted in the job-training period, which was 
given an important role in these stories. The training period was cherished. One 
adviser in his late forties who received his training in the 1980s said that his job 
was taught as “a system of relations” (Int. 8, 708). The investment in training 
was an essential asset of a bank that aimed at a satisfied long-term relationship 
with clients (Int. 8, 266-9). This example is telling in another respect as well. 
This interviewee resigned from his job because he could no longer stand the 
contradictions between official rhetoric and management objectives in his bank.  
The first critical issues in the accounts of client-oriented advisers began with 
the measurement of contact rates and appointment times. These key manage-
ment rules were rejected. Advisers described standardized contact activity in 
accordance with a numerical regime, as for example during promotional cam-
paigns, as opposed to the idea of a “good” advice practice. The following 
statement (from a male adviser in his mid-forties, employed in a regional credit 
union branch with a fixed salary) illustrates this quite well. 
He who is a good adviser, doesn’t need exactly four weeks or six or eight 
weeks, in which he is doing something, instead a good adviser does that all 
year round. (Int. 2, 230-1) 
The second issue concerning client-orientation is the assessment of the client’s 
risk tolerance, which demonstrates the importance of intermediation. Electronic 
client profiles use standardized scales and categories. The understanding of 
these categories requires an individualized inquiry and interpretation, which in 
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general happens throughout the first meeting. The following interview passage 
makes this intuitively accessible. 
What does risk-averse mean? You have to ask the client: what do you see as 
risk-averse? […] or, what do you see as speculative? There are clients, […] 
they tell me: ‘well, Allianz or Deutsche Bank, that’s not speculative. They will 
never go bankrupt, they will still be around, even in a hundred years.’ There 
are other clients, they say: ‘what, oh, nothing that speculative, no and never.’ 
(Int. 2, 891-6) 
Among interviewees, client relations were uniformly perceived as shifting from 
long-term, trustful, personal ties to short-term interactions. Adviser-client rela-
tions in earlier times were assessed as a profound personal tie. Back then, client 
contact required more than one meeting and expanded over time. Its mainte-
nance was highly valued among those interviewees. In contrast, the shift to 
flexible client service policies was rejected because they didn’t allow any “in-
timate” relations to be built. Another reason introduced for long-term relations 
was the character argument: A successful adviser-client relation was regarded 
as a question of the “right match” of personalities (Int. 5, 356). 
Accordingly, a third critical issue was the contrast between a (long-term) 
client-service based on sound client-ties to a (short-term) selling orientation, 
which is explicitly emphasized by the interviewee mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, a male adviser in his mid-forties with a strong client bond:  
If you want to make returns for your bank and be successful, this will only 
work with a sound client relation. Otherwise it is pure selling, and I strictly re-
fuse to do that. […] I hold up my hands and say ‘no’. About this issue I some-
times have problems with my employer because he sometimes has different 
expectations of me. […] [B]ut I refuse. […] [M]y credo is that I want to be 
able to look my clients in the eye in ten years’ time. (Int. 8, 105-11)  
In this interview a good client-relation was not only a matter of reputation but 
also regarded as a long-term profit strategy. It seems in this case that the trust 
and profit aspects are not inherent opposites but partly entangled. 
Another issue in this group was the stress on individual skill. Nearly all ad-
visers explained that they are ordered to offer only a certain selection of mostly 
home-brand products to clients, which is determined by the management be-
forehand and implemented in standard software. So there was a general aware-
ness of constraints on product range. However, for some interviewees this was 
a source of friction. These interviewees put an emphasis on their own expertise 
and skill. Ideally, product recommendations for clients should amount to cus-
tomized solutions based on the advisers’ experience, and also with reference to 
“unwritten rules” (Int. 2, 443), based on customs. That is why a free choice of 
products was highly valued. In contrast, its complete replacement by software 
was criticized. In this connection, documentary obligations that were imple-
mented by German legislation after the post-financial-crisis losses were like-
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wise regarded as limiting their ability to operate quickly on behalf of the client 
(for example in case of fluctuations of stock prices). 
In this connection, some advisers openly disclosed covert practices circum-
venting management guidelines on product choice and commissions (Int. 5, 
423-7). I observed this specifically among interviewees with distinct role con-
fidence and a secure organizational position in credit unions (Int. 2 and 5). In 
particular, software-automated product choices favoring home-brand products 
prompted deviating actions, consistently taken in order to satisfy clients.  
A constant matter of tension was the fact that client-orientation lacks an in-
stitutionalized reward scheme. One consequence is increased job insecurity for 
advisers. Another consequence is their declining commitment, expressed by 
their considering resigning (Int. 2, 1221-36) or actually resigning from their 
job, which was explained by the youngest adviser interviewed in the following 
passage: “My main reason for resigning was that I didn’t like the way I was 
supposed to do my job anymore, that you mustn’t care about clients and their 
needs but only about transactions and products” (Int. 9, 365-8). Therefore this 
adviser defected from a large private bank to a specialized regional bank. 
Sales-Orientation 
It is noticeable that among interviewees with a sales-orientation a clarification 
of job labeling was a constant accompaniment to the narrative. Analogies and 
comparisons to other professions such as car dealers, mechanics, physicians, and 
lawyers were brought up together with the self-description in different contexts. 
One adviser (a male in his mid-thirties, employed in a regional credit union 
branch with a fixed salary and small bonus incentives) phrased it in the initial 
sequence of the interview by saying that “the notion of adviser is misleading 
somehow” (Int. 4, 40-1) explaining that “we are of course in a certain sense 
salesmen – and that’s nothing nasty in and of itself“ (Int. 4, 39-40). 
The interview material from these advisors pointed to the main task of their 
job, making money. There are however differences with regard to who poten-
tially benefits. This is illustrated by the following passage by the only female 
interviewee: “the bank has to make money, the client has to make money […] 
at the bottom line we are all businessmen” (Int. 5, 73-5). Consequently, the 
accounting of sales numbers was an important issue for these advisers. This is 
illustrated by following interview passage from a male adviser from a credit 
union cited just above. 
There [is…] software. That is normal managerial control. I mean that’s like in 
any other commercial profession, knowing exactly, if you are a good busi-
nessman, how much you make out of someone. So I mean I know exactly how 
much I make out of a business and I know how much I can discount or not. I 
know also, when I do it several times, if I lose credibility. (Int. 4, 232-7) 
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This position becomes more telling in several passages throughout the inter-
view which emphasize the exchange aspect. Pecuniary returns for the bank and 
the individual adviser are seen as an exchange for the expenditure of time when 
providing a good service for clients. From the start, this adviser argues that “it 
should be clear to the client that advisers or salesmen naturally want to earn 
with what they do. I don’t do my job on a voluntary basis. A business works 
when it works for both parties” (Int. 4, 131-4). He further clarifies this by stat-
ing in a later passage that “he is not selling off his products, he is taking prices 
for good services” (Int. 4, 251-2). It’s all about “a balance between earning 
money and doing good for the client” (Int. 4, 926-7), and he likewise repeated-
ly made his point by saying that “anyone who accomplishes something should 
be (monetarily) rewarded” (Int. 4, 1059).  
A difficult matter for this type of adviser is irritation about the publicity fi-
nancial services receive. “Our profession has lately been suffering from a bad 
reputation because precisely the fact that we want to earn money is held against 
us” (Int. 4, 440-2). In this argumentative context he offers several analogies 
and comparisons to other trade businesses. One of the main problematic issues 
for this adviser is that clients seem to be ignorant of the time expenditure of 
advisers and little prone to reward it. 
Sales-pressure is also a source of friction, negative reference and dissocia-
tion. Sales targets and the implementation of new technologies compromise 
advisers’ conventional wisdom. This is generally put forward in the context of 
reward and sanction mechanisms. All interviewees were equally aware of the 
valuation practices in their organizations, which are commonly expressed by 
compensation schemes. Orientation to specified targets comes with a calculable 
benefit scheme. Performance is measured according to the number of deals 
executed or the aggregated amount of fees generated, and individual benefits 
are distributed on that basis.14 In many interviews advisers expressed their 
discontent that their professional expertise doesn’t count any longer.  
The following interview gives a disenchanting account of seemingly indis-
soluble contradictions in intermediation. The interviewee argues that “the ad-
viser has to reach his numbers and he doesn’t reach those numbers if he acts in 
the clients’ interest” (Int. 6, 210-1). His personal experience illustrates what 
consequences follow. “If the adviser is not able to realize what is targeted by 
the branch management then you are out. In my case, I was working six months 
for XY bank, and I am glad I don’t have to work there anymore, but my con-
                                                             
14  Among the interviewees I found three different modes of compensation: fixed salary only, 
fixed salary plus commissions, and, commissions only. Advisers who worked on commissions 
only were freelance advisers, some of whom used the premises of single branches. For sav-
ings banks and credit unions it is common to offer fixed salaries or fixed salaries plus com-
missions. Among the interviewees, freelance advisers were only found at all in private banks 
or independently. 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  139 
tract was not extended because I couldn’t do things that were so likely to, well, 
‘screw over the clients’ like the others” (Int. 6, 322-6). One example he gave 
covered (illegal) couple contracts where credit transactions were made on con-
dition of taking out new insurance policies.15 Another example was a deliberate 
increase of the credit sum, although the client’s financially tight position was 
apparent. “The branch manager measures the adviser by contract closings. Do 
you reach the numbers or not? If the adviser wants to keep his job he has to 
reach the numbers […] and you don’t reach the numbers if you act in the inter-
est of the client” (Int. 6, 625-9). Although the sales-orientation has mainly 
negative valuations it is surprisingly dominant in this account. The inclination 
to the client receives cognitive legitimacy, but appears not to be an actionable 
alternative. This adviser is not an isolated case. The following statement from a 
male adviser in his mid-forties already cited above who shares a client orienta-
tion, in fact, mirrors a similar attitude: “if I am not making any money through-
out the whole month, then I don’t have a right to exist, either” (Int. 2, 240). 
When the contradiction to conventional wisdom was too high, management 
objectives were contested or not followed. One vivid example is the evaluation 
of one interviewee of organizational efforts to rationalize product offers. A 
female adviser working in a credit union is not sparing with strong words such 
as "idiocy" when talking about objectives to cover the whole product range for 
each client: the fact that even “the absence [of a certain category of product] 
should call for justification [in the organization] is disgusting” (Int. 5, 642-3). 
5.3   Summary of Findings 
Let me summarize and connect these findings. The data generally demonstrates 
that institutional changes in the financial service industry have set the sales 
departments of bank branches under great pressure. Structural conditions such 
as the standardization of procedures and products and the employment of in-
formation technology and organizational reward schemes are, in the interpreta-
tion of financial advisers, obstacles to tailored financial solutions for individual 
clients. This contradicts the self-proclaimed intentions of customizing as mar-
keting strategy. In summary, it seems that market intermediation is like walk-
ing a tightrope. Here the segmentation of clients appears as an ordering solu-
tion for these markets. Advisers assorted to the “high net worth” segment – in 
my empirical sample these are advisers with a client investment capital of more 
than €100.00016 – differed from other advisers in the sample with regard to 
                                                             
15  In my questions I only asked about investment recommendations; however, some advisers 
also slipped in information on lending activities. 
16  When describing their client segment, interviewees 4 and 5 explicitly mentioned this num-
ber among other markers such as the professions of clients (for example CEOs). Apart from 
this data, I have no further information on the precise segmentation procedures applied in 
the specific bank environments because of anonymity of the interview situation.  
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their intermediation capacity. Despite the explorative character of this study, it 
raises important issues and concerns about financial advice service, which are 
fruitful not only for future research on (segmented) intermediation. I want to 
highlight three findings, in particular. 
A primary finding of this case study is that client- and sales-orientations are 
both present in advice concepts among financial advisers, in some cases united 
in one person. Each orientation was identified by a narrative pattern that is 
structured by a specific valuation of issues such as contacting clients, suggesting 
financial products and maintaining client relations, and the argumentative nexus 
drawn between these issues. We find inclinations to client-orientation in both 
market segments, however with different effectiveness and role confidence (see 
below). The study also showed that client-orientation and role confidence tend 
to overlap in credit unions. However, it is surprising that of all the interviewees, 
it is an adviser from a credit union who shows the most distinct sales-
orientation (Int. 4). This fact hints to some interesting paradoxes in new bank-
ing strategies. Mirroring an argument from client-oriented advisers, interviewee 
4 connects profit-orientation to long-term relations with clients (Int. 4, 865-99). 
Client loyalty is regarded as a sustainable profit strategy. However, it should be 
noted that this interviewee mainly deals with wealthy clients. In his account, the 
link between client welfare and organizational profit appears sound. Certainly, 
bank types and varying incentives systems need to be further taken into consid-
eration. This aspect could be part of a future research agenda (last section). 
The second finding concerns the effectiveness of the intermediation. I as-
sume that advisers strive to carry out their job in line with their conception of 
good advice. If we regard effectiveness as the capacity to intermediate, then the 
data reveals that not all interviewees were equally able to carry out their advice 
conception as they would have liked to. It further shows that the effectiveness 
of advisers’ concepts was strongly dependent on the client segment. Although 
this study is explorative, it suggests that certain advice orientations are more 
effective in specific job environments. The story of client-orientation in the 
retail segment of private banks is connected to a narrative of dissociation, scru-
ples and failures (Int. 9). In the wealth segment it is a story about strong role 
confidence and self-assertion (Int. 2 and 5). In the wealth segment of credit 
unions as well, sales-orientation is part of a uniformly positive narrative (Int. 
4). The contrast to client-orientation even seems to dissipate. In the retail seg-
ment none of the interviewees articulated sales-orientation as an intrinsic driver. 
It was connected to organizational reward and sanctioning mechanisms (Int. 6). 
Nevertheless, it appears to be coherent to conclude that sales-orientation is 
effective in the retail segment (as long as financial advisers can tolerate it). The 
point is that the effectiveness of intermediation underlies above-mentioned 
structural conditions of the working environment and varies across client seg-
ments. Table 1 gives a summary of these findings. 
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Table 1: Effectiveness and Benefits of Advice Concepts Across Client Segments 
  
Retail Segment Wealth Segment 
 
Client-Orientation 
Ineffective Effective 
- Sanction Adviser + Benefit client 
 
Sales-orientation 
Effective (in-) effective* 
+ Benefit Adviser + Benefit Adviser 
*In my sample, sales-orientation in the wealth segment mingles with client-orientation, which 
makes an account on the single effectiveness of sales-orientation difficult. 
 
My last finding concerns the benefits to the persons involved in intermediation. 
There is no data on the financial return of clients. This limitation doesn’t permit 
any conclusions on the impact of advice (either in terms of successful match-
making or financial returns). Given that financial advisers have expert know-
ledge, it seems plausible enough to assume that effective client-orientation on 
the adviser side is of benefit to the client. Also, it can be assumed as obvious 
that following organizational objectives is to the benefit of the adviser. Organi-
zational reward and sanctioning mechanisms set incentives for advisers to act 
as rational agents, which is to live up to sales objectives. However, the data 
gives no hint about the benefits of client-orientation in the retail segment (apart 
from rewards of personal conviction). But there is another aspect to this find-
ing. The data suggests that the stronger the organizational standing of the in-
termediary is, the more she is in a position to occupy client-oriented evaluation 
frames. Reflecting on this result about intermediation as such invites considera-
tions about what kind of positional infrastructure actually allows the intermediary 
to find a balance between the producer and the consumer. Obviously, a weak 
intermediary that can’t effectively follow through with the preferred advice 
concepts is not only a disadvantage to the client, she is also in a disadvanta-
geous position herself. So one problematical scenario in financial services is the 
case where the disadvantaged client is coupled with a disadvantaged adviser.  
6.   Discussion 
What do these findings tell us about the intermediation between production and 
consumption in financial services? First, it becomes clear that intermediation is 
embedded in an institutional context and cast in an organizational mold that 
provides legitimate evaluation frames and classifications.  
To what extent are client classifications a key to understanding market inter-
mediation? It appears that segmentation of clients encourages unequal access to 
Client 
Segment 
Advice concept 
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effective client-oriented advice. Financial advisers in the wealth segment have 
a better chance to follow through with their client-oriented advice concept. 
Among all interviewees they show a strong role confidence, which preserves 
their independence from organizational constraints. The case of the sales-
oriented adviser in this segment is also interesting. When dealing with wealthy 
clients, the contradictions to client-orientation are leveled out. The narrative 
stress on the exchange aspect genuinely included the client interest. All in all, 
advisers in the private wealth segment have preserved a strong confidence in 
their client-orientation and are able to balance conflicting obligations in the 
intermediation between production and consumption.  
What does this result tell us about the market order in financial services? 
Although the empirical scope of the data is limited, the analysis of the interview 
content suggests an unsurprising conclusion on the stratification of the social 
structure. Client segments apparently differ in social status (an observation also 
supported by the physical design of branch offices). And the higher status of 
wealthy clients tends to generate a cumulative disadvantage for the retail seg-
ment. From the explorative character of this study, it would be premature to 
look at segmentation as a single cause of advice inequality. This has always 
already been preceded by an unequal distribution of wealth. However, there is a 
supportive indication in the literature that strategic marketing considerations 
applied in advice relations reinforce this distribution. Banks attempt to increase 
the relationship strength for the most profitable customer segment, the “high 
net worth” segment (Storbacka 1997). This would explain why the degrees of 
freedom are higher for advisers active in this segment. Further empirical in-
quiry is still needed into how segments exactly relate to each other, and also 
how social status rubs off on the intermediary and affects the intermediation 
process. However, there is support for the conclusion that socio-economic 
segmentation along wealth boundaries reinforces social stratification.  
This observation points to the importance of continuously paying attention 
to the classification practices employed in the intermediation of production and 
consumption. As social constructions they are contingent upon non-mandatory 
distinctions. Nevertheless, they intervene heavily in market interactions and 
market exchanges. As outlined in the theory section, a social organization of 
complex markets wouldn’t be feasible without the ordering power of classifica-
tions, so abandoning them altogether is not an option. What appears feasible is 
a systematic review of the social underpinnings of classifications and segmen-
tation. The uncertainties involved in the drawing of categorical boundaries 
together with the massive intervention of classifications (segmentations) calls 
for a profound control system that would allow for the possibility of re-
classification and realignment of related social practices. As we can see in the 
case of financial services, taking segmentation (by wealth) for granted silences 
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the claim for equal opportunities.17 As advisers don’t question the varying 
treatment of clients, because apparently the existence of sufficient financial 
capital seems reason enough, this observation also holds for the marketing 
literature. Here in particular the lack of critical study of classification practices 
shows. What is therefore needed is a deeper empirical investigation into the 
operation of classifications. This holds in particular considering the inclusion 
of large-scale electronic data-bases already documented for the consumer credit 
market (Fourcade and Healy 2013 [2017], Rona-Tas 2017, in this issue). One 
step in such an endeavor is the further examination of the role classifications 
play in the downstream intermediation of production and consumption for 
which it proves to be a fruitful approach. 
So far I accomplished two tasks with this article: I elaborated on the prob-
lem frame of segmented market intermediation, and I presented empirical data 
on advice concepts in the intermediation of financial knowledge. However, this 
study still leaves many questions open, which points to manifold directions for 
future research. One aspect that has remained open is how advisers effectively 
resolve the intermediation between financial products and clients in social 
encounters. Comparing the retail and the private wealth segment, what are the 
particular features of intermediation in action in each segment? What kinds of 
devices are used? In this connection, it would be also insightful to learn if 
advisers reflect on client segments and segmentation processes, and if so, how? 
Regarding the particularities of client-orientation, how do advisers manage to 
keep it up? Which (narrative, relational) strategies do they employ or are avail-
able to them, which allies do they rely on, and how do they withstand organiza-
tional objectives? An examination of how such resilience is practiced would 
need to take organizational characteristics into consideration, such as the role 
of different bank-types, organizational cultures, and other workplace features, 
for example resistance in particular branches, as well as personal characteristics 
of advisers. In the final part of my contribution I want to sketch how a research 
agenda on market intermediation and classification could look. 
7.  What Follows? Research Perspectives 
I started this article by arguing that the theoretical foundation of the study of 
intermediation between production and consumption is still advancing. In par-
ticular, the economy of conventions has a great impact here and has declared 
the “age of intermediaries” (Bessy and Chauvin 2013). While intermediation is 
                                                             
17  It seems beyond doubt that products and specialized services depend on the available 
capital for investment.  
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becoming more important as a topic (for example in Beckert and Musselin 
2013), there are still open research perspectives that I would like to stress.  
Although limited in its scope, I could confirm in this study that the examina-
tion of market classifications opens up a promising research field for the analy-
sis of market intermediation, particularly in areas where a critical inquiry into 
the social underpinnings of classification is still the exception. I unfolded this 
argument using the example of client segmentation. The critical point is the 
following. Intermediation is a two-way engagement. This becomes obvious in 
face-to-face contexts such as in the service industry (even more when classifi-
cations concern subjects, not objects). Although the presence of tensions has 
been acknowledged (Thévenot 2001), the research potential for intermediation 
dynamics has not yet been fully recognized. More systematic research is need-
ed that throws new light on these tensions – even more so as market sociology 
in general would gain from a new linkage between intermediation and institu-
tional embeddedness. To encourage discussion on that subject, I would like to 
close this article with a proposal for a research agenda that focuses on down-
stream intermediation and constraints in balancing tensions along this engage-
ment. Let me be clear that I probably have not done justice to all the efforts in 
this endeavor so far nor do I want to claim originality. 
What is the aim of such a research agenda, what does it want to explore? 
The purpose of a sociological inquiry into market intermediation is to paying 
attention to the formation of categories and segments, watch out for consensus 
and contestation and  reveal the  "definitional power" behind these interven-
tions (Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 1997; Bessy and Chauvin 2013). This 
includes regarding situational factors as well as the institutional context of 
intermediation and identifying actors, their orientations and their role con-
straints, all of which intervene in the bridging of the production and consump-
tion spheres. Such a research program also involves identifying various devices 
(Karpik 2010) that structure intermediation. Market classifications fall under 
such devices. Through their ordering authority, they involve boundary-drawing 
and sorting, which pre-selects the possibilities of social interactions. Intermedi-
ation research aims at examining these processes and their implications and 
consequences.  
A study of intermediation advances on the basis of empirical research. It 
needs data on the social structure of market intermediation, identifying bridg-
ing positions and patterns of relations. The purpose of such an inquiry is very 
much grounded in the idea that studying market intermediations tells us some-
thing about the organization of market exchange. Thereby it exposes an addi-
tional layer of a market order. The classification lens on markets discloses what 
is valued in markets. This could become particularly interesting in moments of 
transformation. Changes in market intermediation (such as the introduction of 
new market classifications) turn into indicators and measures of a changing 
market order. 
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Let me summarize the  reasons why I believe such a research agenda is im-
portant. First, studying the intermediation of chains of production and con-
sumption and shedding light on social underpinnings of markets provides a 
clearer view of the social reproduction of symbolic and material inequality in 
markets. Second, the intermediation of production and consumption is por-
trayed as a multi-level phenomenon involving organizational structures, inter-
action dynamics and the agency of actors. This is likely to provide a better 
understanding of the complexity of markets, the micro-meso-macro link, and in 
particular individual creativity and social resistance towards organizational 
constraints. As a side benefit of following this agenda, the insights won might 
support ventures aiming at the improvement of market operations, which in this 
case could mean creating market institutions that empower the position of the 
intermediary.  
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